Although in general most economists doubt the validity or the use of maMng interpersonal coraparisons, politicians are forced to do this every day. Furthermore in public policy and welfare decisions A is taxed in money to pay B in money. Whether it is possible to give to B at the same rate as we tax A is a problem we wish to examine in our investigation of the meaning of transferable utility.
The purpose of this discussion is to make clear the distinctions behind various a3sunrptions; not to establish their "correctness" or ♦Research undertaken by the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics under Contract Nonr-5055(00) with the Office of Naval Research.
falsehood. It should be stressed however, that without assumptions such as measurahility, comparability and transferability, little meaning can "be attached to concepts such as equality and fair division, or other such words which appear daily in the economic platforms of political parties.
Utility Measures and the Individual
Dividing difficulties, this section concentrates solely upon problems involving the single individual, the measurability of utility and the role of money. In order to make our argument as simple as possible, we restrict ourselves for the most part to considering a world with only two goods and occasionally three.
Ordinal and Cardinal Utility
Suppose that there exists only two goods and that an individual has preferences for bundles of these two goods which can be described by the indifference curve analysis. For ease, suppose the indifference curves of the individual can be described by xy where x is the amount of the first commodity and y the amount of the second. If we have only an ordinal measure for the individual then vä^, xy, log xy 2 -or (xy) are all equally good descriptions. They all preserve the same ordering of preference "between any two 'bundles; and as can be easily seen the marginal rate of substitution between x and y is the same under * U = g(xy) The meaning of an ordinal scale is that in the u-axis in Figure 1 any order preserving transformation g , can be made without k changing the contours in the x and y plane-Only the curvature of the function labelled u = g(xy) will change. The case of u=(xy) is illustrated. If we had used u = vxy then for any fixed ratio between x and y this curve would he a straight line. This can be seen Immediately by considering the bundles (1,1), (2,2) and (5,5). In the first scale, the values of u are 1, k and 9; and in the second scale the values are 1, 2 and 5.
The meaning of the existence of a cardinal utility has nothing whatsoever to do with the shape of the indifference curves, in other woi-ds, the contour may in the x and y plane remain the same. The restriction is in the u axis. Instead of being able to change a utility function U(x,y) for another one g(U(x,y)), if U(x,y) satisfies then onlyother utility functions of the form aU(x,y) + b will do.
Going back to the original example, suppose we have a set of indifference curves which can be represented by xy, -Jxy or g(xy)
to be more general; if we consider the possibility of choice Involving risk, we will be able to show that only one of these forms and linear transformations of it will fit the facts. As all bundles on the same indifference curve will have the same utility whether there exists an ordinal or a cardinal utility we need only examine risk choices involving as "prizes" a bundle of goods on different indifference curves. Let us consider four prizes (0,0), (1,1), (2,2) and (5,5) call them A,, Ap, A,, and A. . Suppose we offered the individual a series of gambles )
1. If we consider (0,0) there is some difficulty in defining marginal rate of substitution as this is a degenerate case; however, for our purposes this difficulty is not relevant at this time.
and discovered in our experiment the following information: He is indifferent between ,8 A 2 and (7^ , 1 l 9 k k ) and also between k^ and vL\ > 1 9 \) • If we regard A, , the prize of (0,0) as having a zero utility and A. as having a utility of 1, then from the above we can call the 1. I^., " utility of Ap, /Q and A,, / g . But only the utility functions U = xy or 11'= axy + b will satisfy this, ^/xy, (xy) and so forth will not be consistent with our observations. This means that except for a number "b" which fixes the zero point on the scale and for a number "a" which fixes the size of the unit we can attach specific "altitude" numbers to the indifference curves. Here the value of b = 0 for (0,0) is fairly natural; had we called A|= 9 then Ap would have been 1 and A, would have been k . This is the same type of measure that exists for temperature. The difference between the fahrenheit and centigrade scales is that for the first a = "/" and b = 32 and for the second a = 1 and b = 0; thus 5 0 c = 9 / (5) + 52 = lfl 0 F.
The Marginal Utility of Money
We now examine a completely different problem. This is the marginal utility of money. There are three references of interest, they 
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The amount that an individual with utility U(x) = x should be willing to pay for this gamble appears to be unbounded. Clearly however, most individuals would not even pay very rauch for a chance to play this game hence, the assumption of U(x) = x does not appear to be tenable. Bernoulli 1 suggested U(x) = log 10 x . This gives: v = l log io a+ --j; log io 2 = 2 los io 2 which is a fairly small amount. Eis choice of the function U(x) » log-Q*. appears to be more or less arbitrary; (although the WeberFechner law is in its fa/or) however, his point that it is unreasonable to assume a linear utility for money over a large range appears to have been well established.
By considering the possibility of gambles for money, Friedman. 5 and Savage were able to suggest a utility function for money of the sort indicated in Figure 2 below An argument involving the change in social If we only wish to assume that the marginal rate of substitution between money and other goods is independent of the amount of money then any transformation g(U(x.) + Xy) where g is monotonic will be feasible. It should be noted that in the first case; that of constant marginal utility, a linear meaemrement of utility was obtained without using probabilities and investigating gambles, in the second case in order to obtain the measure we utilized, gambles.
2,5 Summary
If there exist n commodities and an individual is assumed to have only an ordinal measure on them we can represent his preferences by U(x :L , X 2 , ..., x ) or by any transformed utility function of the form g + l^x-, x , •,,, x )) where g is monotonic.
If we take into consideration the possibility of choice among risky outcomes we find that it becomes possible to limit the description of an individual's preference system to a specific U(x., x , ••., x ) or a related utility function of the form aU(x-, x , •*•, x ) + b .
If we make the very special assumption that there exists a commodity, say commodity n for which the individual has a constant marginal utility this implies that t^x., x^,
) + Xx and it also implies that only transformations of the type aU^, X-, 9< ,o,x ^^^ x)+b will preserve the property of constant marginal utility for commodity n • Here we obtain a linear measure of utility without considering alternatives involving risk.
We can make a special but less restrictive assumption that there exists a commodity, say comn-odlty n for which the individual's marginal rate of substitution is dependent only on the quantities held of the other commodities. This implies that UCx., x p , ..., x ., x )
gfU^XT, x, ..,, x^ ,) + Xx ) will be feasible. In order to obtain a ±2 n-i n measurable utility here we would have to consider alternatives involving risk. Standard diagram Illustrating how a consumer will allocate his "income"
I • But what is this income? How is it measured? There are several different views which can be taken. They depend upon the problem we are looking at and the degree of approximation we are interested in making.
In a barter economy the income of the individual trader may be given in terms of the market value of his assets. Thus if we assume that he comes to market with a units of the first and 0 of the second commDdity then his optimizations program is described as:
Max cp(x,y) subject to p^x + p y = pa.
If we wished to assume the existence of a special institutionally accepted commodity called money which everyone is willing to accept "in payment of all debts, public and private" then the optimizations program is:
Max cpCx^y) subject to p-x + p 2 y = I
The difference between these two is seen when we wish to describe the effect of a "change in income" to the consumer. In the first case where we assume his initial resources are (a,0) we could change his income by giving him a larger endowment of goods or by increasing the price ratio p,/p . In the second case his endowment is (0,0, I), we can increase his income by giving him more money or goods or by decreasing prices p^^ and/or p 2 .
In the first case the price system is defined for 2 "real goods"
and is homogeneous of order 0 j in the second case it is defined for 2 "real goods" and money and is homogeneous of order 1 in the goods as the introduction of money as an entity with a real existence to the consumer adds a constraint to the price system« Hicks has suggested that the "income" illustrated on the y axes in Figure The understanding of the relationship between monetary economics and general equllTbrlum theories Is still slight. It is beyond the scope of this article to add much analysis at this point. However, we should stress the view that all of the models dealt with are approximations and no one Is more "Institution-free" than any other. It appears that the models without an explicit flat money are poorer approximations of the world we live in than ones with money. Peoples' Incomes tend to be in money. At least for the study of individual behavior, the individual is so small compared to the economy that we could more easily give him some more green paper newly printed by the government, to increase his Income as we could give him an extra horse to trade In Böhm Bowerk's horse market. Furthermore for the vast majority of the population the major or only commodity sold is labor and as can be seen from the periods of employment of individuale, formal or informal contractual arrangements determining money income from the sale of labor tend to be such that for the most part the individual knows his money income before he buys.
Without exploring the problem further at this time, we note that st although the formal introduction of money as an n + 1-commodity appears to have no effect on general equilibrium analysis, it does make a difference if the economy is to be viewed as a non-cooperative game.' In the latter, Walras' law is not assumed. Supply does not necessarily have to equal demand, nor budget constraints always be met. In general they will, but when they Our previous analysis has examined only the problems of utility measurement of the individual's preferences. As far as the economics of the isolated consumer are concerned,, the existence of cardinal or ordinal utilities make no difference to the type of behavior we would predict. This is not the case for problems involving two or more players, such as bilateral monopoly for example.
k.l Comparability of Utilities
If we limit ourselves to ordinal measures for every individual, clearly we are unahle to make interpersonal comparisons» If UAx-, x ... x ) and Up(x 1 , x^, ..., x ) are utility functions for two individuals we can make two monotonic transformations gCu,) and f(U 2 ) in which the measures in each scale will have been changed.
What is the situation with a measurable utility? Given U, and U 2 we can still make transformations a U, + b. and a 2 Up + B 2 of the utility scales and hence the statement that a certain outcome or bundle of goods is worth twice as much to A as it is to B cannot be madCo It is interesting to observe that we can still make certain comparative statements if we are at least able to fix a common zero point.
Suppose that we can agree that in the measures of both players the bundle of (0, 0, ..., 0) has zero utility 11,(0, 0, ..., 0) = 0 and The assumption of the existence of a special money commodity with constant marginal utility does not imply comparability of utility.
joint maximum is not defined, as can be seen in the example following: 2 • itLet U,^, x 2 ) = x.. + 2Xp and UJ:«^., x«) = x,. + JXp . The commodity 2 is a "money" to both in the sense that it has a constant marginal utility to both. As we have not assumed comparability then the functions In the first case everything goes to the second person while in the second case everything goes to the first.
U.2 Transferability of Utilities
The phrase "transferability of utility" is possibly confusing»
Even with an ordinal measure of utility, most things have positive value and can be transferred between individuals» In this sense almost everything has a utility and can be transferred. What is usually meant by the existence of a transferable utility is that there exists a commodity or symb "-h that the transfer of the commodity, piece of stone, box of gol^ r number in a bank account is done at a constant rate of marginal substitution to all parties involved»
We may consider two cases, they are:
(1) Transferability without comparability We can now state that the transfer of k units of the second good will result in a change of kk. "utiles" for the first and 5k utiles for the second.
A completely ideal money would not only have a constant marginal utility to all, hut the same marginal utility to all thus, for example, if:
1 2 1 *1^ *2' = :2*T ^2
we could say that a transfer of a unit jf the second commodity always results ii in the transfer of "1 utile.
^.2.3• Comparability Without Transferability» Suppose that two individuals
axe ahle to coinpare their value systems. Furthermore, suppose that they jointly inherit a very valuable painting, they are not permitted to sell it and neither of them has enough assets to buy the other one out. How can they share the painting? They physical properties of the situation cause difficulties in the sharing of this wealth.
If they cut the painting in half they would destroy its value to "both of them, hence this is no answer. They could alternate their possession of the painting; however., if they lived far apart and trans* portation costs were very high this would not he practical. Another way would be to use a random device to decide who gets the picture. The represents what they could obtain in erpected utility by rindomizing, If they used the probability nix 7 = l/2 ; (l -7) = l/2 where 7 is the probability that the first keeps the painting,, then the first has an expected gain of 50 utiles and the second kO , If they used prcbabilities of 7 = k/9 and (1 -7) = 5/9 they would VUi stand to gain the same amount of 1^00/9, If there existed a linear utility money which "both had in sufficient quantity, then the first vould receive the painting and he would make a payment to the second along the line AD.
Without the use of gambles or of a side-payment commodity, even though the individuals can compare utilities the indivisibility makes it impossible to both Jointly optimize and share-A more general example is now considered. Suppose UAx-,? 3f.p) = o x-X-and UpCx,, x.) = x 2 -(x. -k)~ defined for 0 <x < k . Suppose initial conditions are {k 9 0) and (0,l6) respectively. Then including the constraints on the total amount of goods available the first will try to maximize U, = (U -Oxu and the second In this exainple it is interesting to note tha + to the second trader, the second commodity could have served as a "money", but not to the first. The second commodity does not have a constant marginal utility to all.
Suppose that utilities could be measured and compared and that functions given for the traders are their unique utility functions
If they wished to jointly maximize, they would maximize:
which has a maximum on the contract curve at one end with x = N/3 (>/5 -1) -1.7 and x = 10 2/5 with a joint maximum of 2^4-.5 Figure 5 shows root of the Pareto optimal surface mapped in the utility dimensions of the players. A small We can see that for these functions the Pareto surface is concave.
Merely by trading the two goods available the trade . In a situation such as this if we only are interested in optimality conditions or in studying a shadow price allocation mechanism, then even if the assumption of comparable utilities were reasonable it would not be useful as it is not used in those analyses. If, however, we were interested in some type of arbitration scheme even though a side-payment commodity with constant marginal utility to all does not exist the property of comparability might be used in selecting an outcome. More generally söcppose that a soelety lias n ccoraodlties which can "be produced and m individuals» There are three diagrams whi'.;h can be dravn to represent the different aspects of production., distrihution and utility. The first is the efficient production possibility set or the "commodity space". Fcr eican^le^ if there were only two caramodities with a production function linking them we weald have an efficient eet as shown in Figures 8a and 8b depending jpon the existence of diminishing or constant marginal productivity.
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Flg^ire 8a
Figure 3b The reason for asking the question is that if the surface : is net r .oo heavily curved/'' for many of the purposes of running an economy and espe:.iaily welfare economics it miy Ve useful to assume that as a first approximation it can be treated, as flat in some region.
The two conditions we discuss are (l) the existence of a ccmmcdity which has a marginal rate of substitution independent of the quantity held.
and (2) the existence of a population with similar tastes. It is also conjectured that the presence of producxion processes with constant returns to scale tends to flatten out the Pareto optimal surface. The fourth point; a case for an approximation is discussed in 5.2 below.
If there exists a commodity n , such that the utility function for each individual i can he expressed in the form U. (x..., x , ..", x ,) + X. x , then this will cause the Pareto optimal surface to he flat in dimensions involving trade in this commodity. For an example we consider.
U 1 (x 1 . x,.) = x -{k -x 1 ) 2 with initial holdings of (i^O)
The initial holdings were selected, so that 11,(4,0) = 0 and U 2 (0j,117.2) = 0 . We obtain a degenerate form for the Pareto optimal surface involving only x which amounts to saying that there is exactly one trade in x which establishes the same marginal rate of substitution between goods 1 and 2 for both traders. Beyond that any payments made in terms of x will be oti the Pareto optimal surface, which will consist of all points of the form (l, x ) for the first and (3,117.2 -x 2 ) for the second as can be seen from the fcllcwing: Once more we must, stress *~hat in this case the existence of a linearly transferable commod:ty doe^ not ijnply comparability or even cardinality of utilities [ had we at^iomed a constant marginal utility for x thio vould have imp led cnrdi.nali.ty as v/as shewn in 2.2 but not v 8 comparability;.
8. The flatness of the Pareto optimal surface seems also to be related to the uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium. It is also known that if all utility functions are of the form U ^x. ,,. x ? ) 4-A, x this is i J n-1 i n sufficient for a unique competitive eqallibrium point. It is only necessary to look at two commodities and see how the price ratio varies as we move along the contract curve. If this ratio can fluctuate arbitrarily many times; then arbitrarily many CE points are possible, {POT if we look far enough away from the contract curve, there will be regions of potential starting points that will be swept, over arbitrarily many t imea by the "price line"' extended backwards from the contract curve«) Let 2 u (x., y) c f (x) 4 y -ay , i « l, 2 "
The contract curve is given by
where (A., B) is the total bundle of goods in the market. Solving,, we get
SubsJltuting (2) in (l) shows that the contract pri.ee ratio, as a function of x has the form
■y where the constants c, and c 2 can be shown to be positive. But f |(x)
is an essentially arbitrary decreasing function of x , and f'(A-x) is an essentially arbitrary increasing function of x . Hence, the ratio can fluctuate as much as we please, and arbitrarily many CE points can result.
Similarity of Tastes
The assumption of similarity of tastes does not imply that utilities can "be compared. It does not even imply that they can be individually measured. It is the assumption that all individuals have the same preference ordering for all bundles of goods.
If tastes are the same and the utility functions are homogeneous of order 1 (this is an assumption that there is no income effect) then it can be shown that the Pareto optimal surface in the distribution space will be o flat.
It vas pointed out by L. S. Shapley that the word flat may be misleading in the sense that it is actually linearity of a set in dimensions much lower than that of the whole space. It was further suggested that utility functions of the form W. = U,(x n , x_. ... The slope of this straight line is affected only by the total amount of the commocLities available.
The Role of Money
There are many properties of money and taxation as weapons in government policy; we are not concerned with these here. At most we wish to consider government only implicitly as a mechanism for redistributing money.
Many societies for many years have used either a fiat money or a commodity money such as gold or silver as a means of payment for individual commerce and for taxation. It is convenient; the possession of money enables individuals to achieve divisibility without resorting to temporal sharing or to probability devices. Its properties of easy storage and transportation are well known. What is its role as a measure of value?
the utility units, work in welfare policy in particular, and calculations in economics in general would be easier. As doubtful as our calculations are we tend to make them in terms of money.
If the world were smoothly organized and completely competitive we would not need to make welfare calculations because implicitly society would have made its welfare decision (although it would be using only the weak criterion of accepting whatever point a price ray selects on the Pareto optimal surface). This solution, as is well known needs no assumptions concerning measurability, comparability, transferability or the existence 10 of money other than as a double-entry bookkeeping accounting device.
The world however tends not to be completely competitive, even as a good first approximation. Taxes are paid and welfare distributions eure made. The mechanism of voting, for example controls much of the clstribution of wealth. For solutions to the distribution of wealth by means other than pure competition further consideration needs to be given to properties such as measurability, comparability and transferability.
As we have noted these are three separate problems.
(l) Measurability usually hinges upon the acceptance of some plausible additional assumptions concerning the ordering of preferences with risk.
10. We also know that the solution in general is not unique and that the different competitive equilibria can easily call for radically different distributions of income. The assumption of linearity here seems more reasonable than for the individual.
A most important institutional reason for treating money as though it were a special "imaginary commodity" with a constant generalized purchasing power is the basic unfeasibility of running a complex economy by barter. " The productive value of calculating with a dollar and using as a first approximation the transferability implicit in the definition that "a dollar is a dollar," is considerable. This is equivalent to adapting the convention of "let us act as though the Pareto optimal surface were flat as a first approximation," in the money dimension.
In a modern capitalist economy the ratio between capital goods and consumption goods tends to be high (at a guess between 5 or 8 to l) this means that much of economic activity is the exchange of certificates of ownership for nonconsumer goods; and much of this exchange is performed by fiduciaries s^ch as governments, financial and nonfinancial corporations.
Fiat Money and Flatness on the Pareto Optimal Surface
Suppose that there is a region of the Pareto optimal surface in the distribution space which is flat but no "moneylike" commodity actually exists. If the competitive equilibrium were unique then for any taxation 11. For instance, see Bagehot, W., Lombard Street, R. D. Irwin (New York, 1962) p. 65 (Ist edition, London :-.bF5^
and distribution policy if fiat money were issued against all assets (and velocity remained constant) then a constant amount of fiat money would be needed and regardless of distribution the total value of all assets in the economy would remain constant in the region and this number would become a relatively significant measure of overall welfare.
If the economy of a society such as the one noted above were viewed as a game rather than as a competitive market with redistribution, the government might print extra money rather than tax to try to attain its objectives and individuals would have monetary strategies to try to influence velocity. In such a model it would be necessary to specify bankruptcy laws and other financial institutional details.
Although flatness of the Pareto optimal surface implies the existence of transferability, flatness is not a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium as is shown in Figure 9 . In this 0 Figure 9 instance the total value of all assets in the economy would not remain constant under transfers. Diagram 9 was drawn with three equilibrium points,
There is a conjecture since Märshall that the number of equilibrium points in an economy must be odd.
If the transferable commodity is not symbolic, but is an actual good which enters the utility functions in the form that U i^Xl' X 2 > '"> X n-V x iJ ~ \( X V x 2' °" } X n-1^ + X i X n ; then if the Pareto optimal surface were not otherwise flat, the region of flatness would depend on the amount and distribution of the monetary commodity.
If everyone has plenty of it^ then a government redistribution of sufficiently small size would not effect the distribution of the first n-1 commodities or the price system. In this case the total value of all assets in terms of "gold" will remain constant. If there is a shortage of commodity money the price structure of the n-1 first commodities wiD be effected by taxation, hence the total value of all assets will change.
The "hot potato" velocity change effects, when the handling of fiat money is viewed as a noneooperative game_, will not be seen here inasmuch as the "gold" has a utility of its own. As there is a fixed amount of the "gold" and it has a utility., then all individuals will in total be willing to hold the supply. If all act competitively then some may hold gold bars in their possession without ever using them in the market. This should net be confused with hoarding, which must be viewed strategically as an act in a "money game." Here the actual money commodity 12 has value by itself and hence is worth having.
12. If we view the economy as a game of indefinite length, then even though fiat money has no intrinsic value an induced or derived utility may be found for it. Similarly steel mills may not enter directly into an individual's preference system but they too can be assigned a derived utility. The shape of the derived utility f-unctions has only been partially explored.
Conclusions
The problems of ordinallty, measurabllity, transferability and the use of money are different hut highly related. Ordinality and cardinality concern individual preferences. Cardinality can he obtained from the ordinal properties of preferences either by considering behavior under risk, or by assuming a very special form for the utility functions (this form is related to but different from the assumption of something called money with a constant marginal utility to all).
Transferability concerns the existence of comuiOdities or a surrogate commodity whose marginal rate of substitution is independent of the quantity possessed by any individual.
The same special assumption restricting the shape of the preference functions which is enougn to establish cardinality, i.e., u(x-,, x 2 , ..p., x _,, x ) -ii^x,, Xp, .«,", x .) + X x is enough to establish transferability. But this assumption is not necessary either for measurability or transferability.
The existence of transferability is equivalent to the Pareto optimal surface being flat in at Itast some part of the distribution space.
The existence of both transferability and comparability calls for the Pareto optimal surface to be flat in both the distribution space and the utility space.
The importance of different assumptions concerning measurability and comparability arises when welfare decisions employing criteria of \ > -i+1 -equality or fairness are applied; or when other solution concepts are utilised instead of the competitive market mechanism.
The flatness of the Pareto optimal surface with the n good having the appropriate special properties gives rise to a natural commodity money. Flatness or approximate flatness without this means in some cases that a fiat money can be introduced to serve both as a medium for carrying on trade and taxation.
The introduction of fiat money when the Pareto optimal surface is st flat is equivalent to introducing an n+1 ' "imaginary commodity ,:
with a constant "generalized purchasing power»"
Although it is conjectured that flatness in the distribution space is a good approximation in a large neighborhood, even if it were false, it is suggested that the investigation of the shape of induced utility functions and the shape of the Pareto optimal surface is an important preliminary to a positive welfare theory.
